Re: Clinton Administration ultimately responsible for 9/11
Anyways back to the original subject. Rob I think you understimate what Clinton's administration was doing and how much sleeping Bush's was doing:
[quote]Early 2001: Bush Staffers Less Concerned with Terrorism
Clinton and Bush staff overlap for several months while new Bush appointees are appointed and confirmed. Clinton holdovers seem more concerned about al-Qaeda than the new Bush staffers. For instance, according to a colleague, Sandy Berger, Clinton's National Security Adviser, had become ?totally preoccupied? with fears of a domestic terror attack. [Newsweek, 5/27/02] Brian Sheridan, Clinton's outgoing Deputy Defense Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, is astonished when his offers during the transition to bring the new military leadership up to speed on terrorism are brushed aside. ?I offered to brief anyone, any time on any topic. Never took it up.? [Los Angeles Times, 3/30/04] Army Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick, Deputy National Security Adviser and manager of Clinton's NSC (National Security Council) staff, still remains at the NSC nearly four months after Bush takes office. He later notes that while Clinton's advisers met ?nearly weekly? on terrorism by the end of his term, he does not detect the same kind of focus with the new Bush advisers: ?That's not being derogatory. It's just a fact. I didn't detect any activity but what [Clinton holdover Richard] Clarke and the CSG [Counterterrorism and Security Group] were doing.? [Washington Post, 1/20/02] Kerrick submits a memo to the new people at the NSC, warning, ?We are going to be struck again.? He says, ?They never responded. It was not high on their priority list. I was never invited to one meeting. They never asked me to do anything. They were not focusing. They didn't see terrorism as the big megaissue that the Clinton administration saw it as.? Kerrick adds, ?They were gambling nothing would happen.? [Los Angeles Times, 3/30/04] Bush's first Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Henry Shelton, later says terrorism was relegated ?to the back burner? until 9/11. [Washington Post, 10/2/02]
People and organizations involved: Bush administration, Clinton administration, Hugh Shelton, National Security Council, Donald Kerrick, Counterterrorism and Security Group, Sandy Berger, Brian Sheridan, al-Qaeda[/quote]
[quote]April 20, 2000: Some Complain Clinton Administration Focusing Too Much on Terrorism
The Washington Post writes, ?With little fanfare, [President Clinton] has begun to articulate a new national security doctrine in which terrorists and other ?enemies of the nation-state? are coming to occupy the position once filled by a monolithic communist superpower.? In his January 2000 State of the Union address, President Clinton predicts that terrorists and organized criminals will pose ?the major security threat? to the US in coming decades. However, some claim that a ?preoccupation with bin Laden has caused errors in judgment.? National Security Adviser Sandy Berger counters that the threat of large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil is ?a reality, not a perception. ... We would be irresponsible if we did not take this seriously.? Counterterrorism ?tsar? Richard Clarke predicts that the US's new enemies ?will come after our weakness, our Achilles heel, which is largely here in the United States.? [Washington Post, 4/20/00]
People and organizations involved: Osama bin Laden, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, Sandy Berger, Richard A. Clarke[/quote]
[quote]Mid-August 1998-2000: US Submarines Ready to Attack bin Laden
Within days of the US African embassy bombings, the US permanently stations two submarines, reportedly in the Indian Ocean, ready to hit al-Qaeda with cruise missiles on short notice. Missiles are fired from these subs later in the month in a failed attempt to assassinate bin Laden. Six to ten hours' advance warning is now needed to review the decision, program the cruise missiles, and have them reach their target. However, in every rare opportunity when the possibility of attacking bin Laden occurs, CIA Director Tenet says the information is not reliable enough and the attack cannot go forward. [Washington Post, 12/19/01; New York Times, 12/30/01] At some point in 2000, the submarines are withdrawn, apparently because the Navy wants to use them for other purposes. Therefore, when the unmanned Predator spy plane flies over Afghanistan in late 2000 and identifies bin Laden, there is no way to capitalize on that opportunity. [Clarke, 2004, pp 220-21] The Bush administration fails to resume the submarine patrol. Lacking any means to attack bin Laden, military plans to strike at him are no longer updated after March 2001. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (B)]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, George Tenet, Osama bin Laden, Bush administration, Clinton administration[/quote]
[quote]January 10, 2001-September 4, 2001: Armed Predator Drone Is Readied, but Unused
Even before President Bush's official inauguration, Clinton holdover counterterrorism ?tsar? Richard Clarke pushes National Security Adviser Rice and other incoming Bush officials to resume Predator drone flights over Afghanistan (originally carried out in September and October 2000) in an attempt to find and assassinate bin Laden. [Washington Post, 1/20/02; CBS News, 6/25/03] On January 10, Rice is shown a video clip of bin Laden filmed by a Predator drone the year before. [Washington Post, 1/20/02] Clarke learns of an Air Force plan to arm the Predator. The original plan calls for three years of testing, but Clarke pushes so hard that the armed Predator is ready in three months. [New Yorker, 7/28/03] A Hellfire missile is successfully test fired from a Predator on February 16, 2001. [CBS News, 6/25/03] In early June, a duplicate of the brick house where bin Laden is believed to be living in Kandahar, Afghanistan, is built in Nevada, and destroyed by a Predator missile. The test shows that the missile fired from miles away would have killed anyone in the building, and one participant calls this the long sought after ?holy grail? that could kill bin Laden within minutes of finding him. [Washington Post, 1/20/02] Clarke repeatedly advocates using the Predator, armed or unarmed. However, bureaucratic infighting between the CIA and the Air Force over who would pay for it and take responsibility delays its use. Clarke later says, ?Every time we were ready to use it, the CIA would change its mind.? [New Yorker, 7/28/03] Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley decide to delay reconnaissance flights until the armed version is ready. In July 2001, Hadley directs the military to have armed Predators ready to deploy no later than September 1. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (D)] The issue comes to a head in early September, but even then, a decision to use the Predator is delayed [New Yorker, 7/28/03]
People and organizations involved: Richard A. Clarke, Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush[/quote]
I find the following especially interesting since Wolfo's part of the PNAC:
[quote]April 30, 2001: Wolfowitz in Deputy Secretary Meeting: Who Cares About [bin Laden]?
The Bush administration finally has its first Deputy Secretary-level meeting on terrorism. [Time, 8/4/02] According to counterterrorism ?tsar? Richard Clarke, he advocates that the Northern Alliance needs to be supported in the war against the Taliban, and the Predator drone flights need to resume over Afghanistan so bin Laden can be targeted. [Clarke, 2004, pp 231] Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the focus on al-Qaeda is wrong. He states, ?I just don't understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden,? and ?Who cares about a little terrorist in Afghanistan?? Wolfowitz insists the focus should be Iraqi-sponsored terrorism instead. He claims the 1993 attack on the WTC must have been done with help from Iraq, and rejects the CIA's assertion that there has been no Iraqi-sponsored terrorism against the US since 1993. (A spokesperson for Wolfowitz later calls Clarke's account a ?fabrication.?) [Clarke, 2004, pp 30, 231; Newsweek, 3/22/04] Wolfowitz repeats these sentiments immediately after 9/11 and tries to argue that the US should attack Iraq. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage agrees with Clarke that al-Qaeda is an important threat. Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley, chairing the meeting, brokers a compromise between Wolfowitz and the others. The group agrees to hold additional meetings focusing on al-Qaeda first (in June and July), but then later look at other terrorism, including any Iraqi terrorism. [Clarke, 2004, pp 30, 231-32] Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff I. Lewis ?Scooter? Libby and Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin also attend the hour-long meeting. [Time, 8/4/02]
People and organizations involved: Northern Alliance, Richard Armitage, Bush administration, Stephen Hadley, Taliban, Richard A. Clarke, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Promis, Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, John McLaughlin, Paul Wolfowitz[/quote]
[quote]September 4, 2001: Debate Heats Up over Predator Drone; Decision Again Delayed
Attendees to an important cabinet-level meeting on terrorism have a heated debate over what to do with the Predator drone. Counterterrorism ?tsar? Richard Clarke has been repeatedly pushing for the use of the Predator over Afghanistan (in either armed or unarmed versions), and he again argues for its immediate use. Everyone agrees that the armed Predator capability is needed, but there are disputes over who will manage and/or pay for it. CIA Director Tenet says his agency will operate the armed Predator ?over my dead body.? [Washington Post, 10/2/02] Clarke recalls, ?The Air Force said it wasn't their job to fly planes to collect intelligence. No one around the table seemed to have a can-do attitude. Everyone seemed to have an excuse.? [New Yorker, 7/28/03] National Security Adviser Rice concludes that the armed Predator is not ready (even though it had been proven in tests during the summer), but she also presses Tenet to reconsider his opposition to immediately resume reconnaissance flights, suspended since September the year before. After the meeting, Tenet agrees to proceed with such flights. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (C); 9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (D)] The armed Predator is activated just days after 9/11, showing that it was ready to be used after all. [Associated Press, 6/25/03]
People and organizations involved: George Tenet, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice[/quote]
[quote]December 2000: Incoming Bush Administration Briefed on Terrorism Threat; Apparently Ignores Recommendations
CIA Director Tenet and other top CIA officials brief President-elect Bush, Vice President-elect Cheney, future National Security Adviser Rice, and other incoming national security officials on al-Qaeda and covert action programs in Afghanistan. Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt recalls conveying that bin Laden is one of the gravest threats to the country. Bush asks whether killing bin Laden would end the problem. Pavitt says he answers that killing bin Laden would have an impact but not stop the threat. The CIA recommends the most important action to combat al-Qaeda is to arm the Predator drone and use it over Afghanistan. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04; Reuters, 3/24/04 (B)] However, while the drone is soon armed, Bush never gives the order to use it in Afghanistan until after 9/11 (see September 4, 2001).
People and organizations involved: George Tenet, al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, James Pavitt, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice[/quote]
I suppose thats enough reading for now :P